Abstract. In this paper we present protocols checking the equality of two distributed numbers and calculation of the product in such a way that the distributed numbers are unknown to anyone. The presented protocols use the Chinese Remainder Theorem. As a result, the obtained protocols have many interesting cryptographic features.
Introduction
This paper discusses the multiparty computation protocols with the use of the Chinese Remainder Theorem. Of the many protocols with such application, we discuss two selected protocols. We adopt the honest-but-curious framework of multiparty computations, executed collectively in a fully (completely) decentralized environment of cooperating agents (participants, players, computers, servers, processes, devices, mobile devices), in which ݇ ≥ 3 parties collectively generate a protocol result. Because of the cryptographic application, the typical length of the participants' shares should be greater than 500 bits.
The integer is never revealed to any party. We assume that our protocol is run without any trusted party (server, dealer, or central authority).
The participants are assumed to communicate over secure channels, meaning that the messages sent from one participant to the other are private and no one can interfere along the way. We assume that all participants follow the protocol honestly.
Fully distributed or fully decentralized means: with no trusted party whatsoever and with all the parameters shared as secret.
The main idea is that both the input and output integer parameters are never revealed. Instead, they are shared by participants using an appropriate secret sharing. We are going to use the elementary additive secret sharing but also secret sharing based on Shamir secret sharing as in [1, 2] and the BGW method [3, 4] . We use also the Chinese Remainder Theorem (see [2] and [5] ). In the area of multiparty computation, five papers [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] deserve special attention. The papers deal with distributed primality testing.
Our paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we discuss Shamir's secret sharing. Section 3 presents the BGW method, which is a protocol for distributed product computing. In Section 4 we introduce two new protocols, using the Chinese Remainder Theorem. Finally, Section 5 concludes the paper.
Shamir's secret sharing
The first threshold schemes were initiated by two papers published almost simultaneously in 1979, A. Shamir How to share a secret [1] and G. Blakley Safeguarding cryptographic keys [11] .
To build a threshold scheme, Adi Shamir [1] uses a polynomial over a finite field. First, a prime number has to be selected (let's call it ‫,)‬ which is greater than the number of protocol parties ݊ and greater than a password (secret, key) ‫.ܭ‬ The password will be distributed among the parties. If the threshold is ‫,ݐ‬ it is generated a polynomial ݂ሺ‫ݔ‬ሻ of degree ‫ݐ‬ − 1 with coefficients derived from the field ℤ ‫))(ܨܩ(‬ and free term equal ‫.ܭ‬ A prime number ‫‬ is public, and the coefficients of the polynomial must be secret and known only to the person choosing them, i.e. the dealer. The shares of the distribution, also known as the shadows, are the values of this polynomial for ݊ different arguments.
Let's denote a share belonging to the party ݅ by ‫ܭ‬ . It is often assumed that ‫ܭ‬ = ݂ሺ݅ሻ mod ‫.‬ ‫ݐ‬ or more participants can reconstruct the password ‫.ܭ‬ The reconstruction is to restore the polynomial based on at least ‫ݐ‬ its values and computing the value at zero of this polynomial. Generally, we often use here Lagrange interpolation formula.
A more general approach to the presented problem can be found by the reader in [12] [13] [14] .
Secret sharing
A dealer (a trusted third party) has to generate a random password ‫ܭ‬ (‫∈ܭ‬ℕ+). Then the dealer shares the key among ݊ parties (participants). He executes this as follows; he randomly selects a prime number ‫‬ of a feature that ‫‬ > max(K, n) and assumes that ܽ = K. Now the dealer randomly chooses ‫ݐ‬ − 1 coefficients ܽ ଵ , ܽ ଶ , … , ܽ ௧ିଵ belonging to the field ℤ and he denotes
The dealer computes ‫ܭ‬ ൌ ݂ሺ݅ሻ mod ‫‬ for 1⩽ i ⩽ n, and he distributes a pair of numbers ൫i, K ൯ to each participant.
Distribution of password ‫ܭ‬ 1. The dealer generates a prime number ‫‬ greater than maxሺK, nሻ and defines ܽ = K.
He denotes in field
3. He computes ‫ܭ‬ = ݂ሺ݅ሻ mod p, for 1⩽ i ⩽ n and sends the share ൫i, K ൯ to the party ݅.
Password reconstruction
‫ݐ‬ or more parties (the participants) can appoint password ‫.ܭ‬ There are several options that can be proposed here. The most common way of obtaining a key ‫ܭ‬ is the Lagrange interpolation formula. Suppose, we have shares ‫ݐ‬ of participants
The product of two unknown to anyone (distributed) factors -the BGW method
This section discusses the protocol of distributed product computing -the BGW protocol [3, 4] (acronym of authors' last names Ben-Or M., Goldwasser S., Wigderson A.). The party in the submitted protocols is equated with the participant (computer or server) of protocol. In the submitted protocols, three or more parties will take part. We assume that each party may communicate with any other party. Messages sent from one participant to the other are private, and no one can interfere along the way. Furthermore, we assume that all parties of the protocol are fair.
In consequence of this, presented protocol is parties may recover the factors of the mentioned product. The reason for this is privacy of the used BGW method. Replacing the BGW method by the Cocks method [15] , the presented method can achieve the greatest possible privacy, i.e. ݊ − 1.
In our protocol there are ݊ participants involved, and ܰ is the product of two numbers ‫‬ and ‫.ݍ‬ The party ݅ has secret numbers ‫‬ and ‫ݍ‬ , called its shares.
The sum of the shares is ‫‬ and ‫ݍ‬ in such a way that ‫‬ = ∑ ‫‬
i=ଵ . This method shows a distributed computing ܰ = ሺ∑ ‫‬ i=ଵ ሻሺ∑ ‫ݍ‬ i=ଵ ሻ mod P so that none of the parties could know both ‫‬ or ‫,ݍ‬ and only a coalition of more than ିଵ ଶ parties can recognize factors ‫‬ and ‫.ݍ‬ So, in order to know the factorization of ܰ, you have to bribe at least half of the protocol participants. The protocol is derived from the work of Ben-Or, Goldwasser and Wigderson, in which the authors describe an elegant protocol to compute ܰ, for three or more parties. Practically, we take a prime number ܲ greater than ܰ. Let also s = ቔ ିଵ ଶ
ቕ.
The BGW method for distributed computation ܰ = ሺ∑ ‫‬ ሻ ⋅ ሺ∑ ‫ݍ‬ ሻ mod P 1. Each party chooses two random polynomials of degree ‫,ݏ‬ i.e. party ݅ chooses ݂ , g ∈ ℤ ሾܺሿ, such that ݂ ሺ0ሻ = p , g ሺ0ሻ = q and a random polynomial ℎ ∈ ℤ ሾܺሿ of degree 2s, such that ℎ ሺ0ሻ = 0. 2. Each party computes 3n values, i.e. party ݅ computes:
The result is given to the public or transmitted to other parties. 4. Parties, having ܰ with using Lagrange interpolation formula, receive polyno-
In view of the equality ߙሺ0ሻ = N parties receive N.
Proposed protocols
In this section we will present original protocols checking the equality of two distributed numbers and distributed multiplication, using the Chinese Remainder Theorem. We will indicate the correctness of these protocols and we will present their bit complexity. Although such solutions are known so far, we have not cognized such a type of approach for the considered issues.
Chinese Remainder Theorem
Chinese Remainder Theorem is a theorem that is widely applicable in cryptography. It can often be used to speed up the computations. In addition, it is used to construct a number of libraries for computations on large integers. Libraries of this type find application in the aforementioned cryptography.
Theorem (Chinese Remainder Theorem).
If the integers ݊ ଵ , ݊ ଶ , … , ݊ are pairwise relatively prime, then the system of simultaneous congruences It is easy to notice that the algorithm can use a mechanism of parallelization or distribution. We use the algorithm in the following protocols. If we know the values ܽ ,݊ , N, we can determine the value ‫ݔ‬ in a fast O൫log 2 N൯ operations) and simple way.
The protocol verifying equality of two distributed numbers
The following procedure involves a group of ݇ participants of the protocol, in which the participant ݅ holds the shares ܲ and ܳ .
In the procedure given below, the result of subtraction of ܳ and ܲ does not leak any information if the coalition of conspiring parties is less than ݇.
The procedure returns true, when ∑ܲ = ∑ܳ , and false, when ∑ܲ ≠ ∑ܳ . We assume that all parties know a collection of ݇ primes p ଵ , p ଶ ,..., p (or, at least, pairwise relative primes) such that ∑ሺܳ − ܲ ሻ < ∏ ‫‬ . To improve efficiency, the public primes p ଵ , p ଶ ,..., p should be as small as possible and at the same time they should be close to each other.
The main idea of this procedure is based on the Chinese Remainder Theorem.
Step 1 gives a new distributed number S = ܳ − ܲ. Next, each party ݅ produces shares ‫ݓ‬ for the integer ܵ = ܳ − ܲ using the Chinese Remainder Theorem.
Shares are sent via secure channels to the other parties. In Step 4, all parties check the equality and broadcast their results. In this chapter, we assume that the value of λ is ሺ−1ሻ k+ଵ ቀ ݇ ݅ ቁ.
equal (ܲ , ܳ , k, p ଵ , p ଶ , ..., p ; ∑ܲ = ∑ܳ is true) INPUT: of party ݅: ܲ , ܳ , k and the set p ଵ , p ଶ ,..., p of public primes. OUTPUT: of party ݅: true/false an answer to the question: whether ∑ܲ = ∑ܳ ?
1. Each party computes its own share in ܵ, which is the result of subtraction of ܲ and ܳ; i.e., party ݅ computes 11. Party ݅ computes ‫ݏ‬ = λ ‫ݖ∑‬ mod q.
12. Parties reveal their values ‫ݏ‬ , if the sum equals zero, they return true, otherwise false.
Analysis of complexity
In the procedure analysed here, we assume that the length of all the shares in the distributed number does not exceed ݊ bits and the number of participants is ݇. The communication overload complexity (the number of bits that each participant must send to the others) of the procedures is ܱሺ݇ ⋅ ݊ሻ.
The procedure equal (ܲ , ܳ , ݇, p ଵ , p ଶ , ..., p ; ∑ܲ = ∑ܳ is true) needs ܱሺ݊ ⋅ ݇ ଷ ⋅ log ݇ bit operations and their communication complexity is ܱ݇⋅݊.
Correctness of the distributed equality checking
The protocol checking the equality of two distributed numbers is equal(ܲ ,ܳ , k ,p ଵ , p ଶ , ..., p ; ∑ܲ = ∑ܳ is true). Each party involved in this procedure inputs, in addition to its shares in the two distributed integers, ݇ (relative) primes. The product of those primes is supposed to be bigger than the difference between the two numbers that we are comparing; i.e. ܳ − P < ∏ ‫‬ . The protocol returns true when ቀ∑‫ݓ‬ mod p ቁ = ቀ∑‫ݒ‬ mod p ቁ, for each 1⩽ j ⩽ k. We continue our analysis for a fixed prime ‫‬ . The last equality entails that in step 3 of the pro-
we get ሺ∑ܵ ሻmod p = 0. Hence, for each 1⩽ j ⩽ k, we have ሺܳ − ܲሻ mod p = 0. Finally, by the fact that ܳ − P < ∏ p we get the equality of ܲ and ܳ.
The protocol computing the product of two distributed factors with use of the Chinese Remainder Theorem
This section discusses the protocol of distributed product computing with the use of the Chinese Remainder Theorem. As in the previously submitted protocols, there are three or more parties participating in the protocol. We assume that each party may communicate with any other party. Messages sent from one participant to the other are private, and no one can interfere along the way. Furthermore, we assume that all parties of the protocol are fair.
In consequence of this, the presented protocol is ݇ − 1 private. There are ݇ participants involved in this protocol and ܰ is the product of ܲ and ܳ. The party ݅ has two secret numbers ܲ and ܳ called its shares. The sum of the parts is ܲ and ܳ, such that P = ∑ܲ , ܳ = ∑ܳ . This method presents distributed computation ܰ = ሺ∑ܲ ሻሺ∑ܳ ሻ mod M , so that no party could learn neither ܲ nor ܳ and only a coalition of more than ݇ − 1 parties can get to know factors ܲ and ܳ. So, in order to know factorization ܰ, you have to bribe at least half of the protocol participants. Practically, you have to take a prime number ‫ܯ‬ greater than ܰ. Below we present the protocol of distributed computing of N = ሺ∑ܲ ሻሺ∑ܳ ሻ mod M.
Conclusions
In this paper we focus on the applications of the Chinese Remainder Theorem in protocols for verifying the equality of two distributed numbers and computing the product of two distributed numbers. The discussed protocols form the beginning of our research on applications in the field of multilateral Chinese Remainder Theorem computations. We intend to expand our research into other protocols, among others, protocols for comparing distributed numbers (Millionaires' problem) or protocols for remainder computation etc.
Presented protocols can be used in more advanced protocols, including distributed primality testing. The problem will be described in the next article which will be published soon. In this article I will be co-authored. Another proposed research will be application of the proposed protocols.
